


~~SENSITIVE~~

~~Top Secret~~

CIA/SAVA /WVIND 730203



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending February 3, 1973



NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.

For the President Only

~~*Top Secret*~~


SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1973
Weekly average for each month




NOVEMBER 1972 -- FEBRUARY 1973
Weekly data as reported


US BATTLE DEATHS dropped to two from the four of the previous week.




SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS totaled 692 for the week. This figure is preliminary and may change considerably as more complete information becomes available.




INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE include three regular, six special purpose and 12 "gap fill" groups totaling 5,889 personnel. The estimate of infiltrators destined for South Vietnam and Cambodia since 1 October 1972 now stands at some 50,500-52,500.



ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS jumped from last week's 402 to 1,696 for the first week of the ceasefire.



ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION climbed to 4,303 from the 1,433 of last week.



Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

There was a high level of enemy initiated activity in South Vietnam for the first 48 hours after the cease-fire agreement went into force, but throughout the rest of the week there was a steady decline in the rate of reported violations. To the north of Quang Tri City, GVN Marines early in the week were forced to give up some territory on the bank of the Cua Viet which they had taken in the last moments before the ceasefire went into effect. South of Quang Tri City, the North Vietnamese gained a foot hold on the east bank of the Thach Han River in the ARVN Airborne Division's area of operations, but the situation has now been stabilized. In MR-2, Communist forces during the week attempted -- with mixed success -- to interdict key lines of communication, and GVN forces continue to fight back against these clear violations of the ceasefire. Most of the military action in MR's 3 and 4 since the official start of the ceasefire has been fairly small scale. Local Viet Cong units have launched widely scattered and largely ineffective attacks and will probably continue such activities until the teams of the International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS) get into place. Intelligence reporting from some areas of South Vietnam indicates that the Communists plan to launch a larger scale effort to gain territory just prior to the arrival of ICCS teams on the local level, but it is doubtful that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces have the capability of carrying out these plans.

Military action in Cambodia was light during the week. Government forces backed by Cambodian air support have finally dislodged Communist elements from a short section of Route 4 about 35 miles southwest of Phnom Penh. In the North, the Communists continued to carry out small harassing attacks around Kompong Thom. Elsewhere there was very little military action. An intercepted message of 29 January from a high-level Khmer insurgent authority instructed insurgent elements in the Phnom Penh "special region" to concentrate on fomenting strikes, demonstrations, and other "political resistance movements" in the capital. The message also called for increased sapper attacks and sabotage operations at important points throughout the city. There are, however, as yet no indications that the Khmer insurgent movement is backing away from its previous hardline opposition to any form of cease-fire arrangement or political negotiations with the Lon Nol government.

In Laos, the last major friendly base in the northwestern corner of the country -- Nam Yu -- was overrun by a Communist force on 3 February. The action was reminiscent of the Nam Tha defeat of 1962 which left much of northwest Laos in Communist hands. Then, as now, the enemy land grab occurred on the eve of decisive peace talks, and was intended to strengthen the Communist bargaining position. Government reinforcements have been moved into the area south of Nam Yu, but -- unless the base can be quickly retaken -- its loss will seriously erode the government's claim to all of Houa Khong Province. Elsewhere in north Laos, friendly irregular forces have improved their defensive positions in the Long Tieng Valley and captured several points of high ground. Bouam Long, the government enclave north of the Plaine des Jarres, now seems out of danger as enemy forces have shifted away from the base. Communist forces in north Laos now appear to be concentrating their efforts on the defense of the old Neutralist capital of Muong Soui against government units maneuvering to recover the town. Because the Communists will wish to control the neutralist cabinet posts in any new coalition government, they will attach some importance to holding Muong Soui and to maintaining or improving their position in the traditional neutralist territory along Highway 13 between Vientiane and Luang Prabang. In southern Laos the Communists are still harassing Thakhek in the central panhandle, while on the Bolovens plateau and in the Saravane Valley enemy-initiated activity has picked up markedly. Friendly forces are sustaining heavy casualties in these latter two sectors, and government commanders have declared a tactical emergency in the region.

Enemy Infiltration and Logistics

During the week some 5,900 new NVA personnel were accepted into the estimate of infiltrators destined for South Vietnam and Cambodia. About 5,000 of these infiltrators were accepted as "gap fills" and may have entered the infiltration pipeline as early as December 1972. There have been no new infiltration groups detected entering the infiltration system at Vinh since 16 January 1973. This apparent lack of infiltration activity at what is normally the peak of the season points to a cutting back in movement of personnel to the South.

On the logistics front, increased maritime activity has been noted near Haiphong, and the North Vietnamese have resumed large-scale shipping southward along the coast. The flurry of shipping activity follows previous patterns; the North Vietnamese moved large amounts of materiel south by coastal freighter shortly after the U.S. bombing halted in 1968. The increase in waterborne supply movements probably accounts in part for the recently noted decrease in vehicle activity in the Vinh area as the major overland supply effort appears to have shifted southward from the Vinh area to Quang Binh Province just above the DMZ. Truck traffic, moreover, has continued at a high level in the Laos Panhandle since the ceasefire went into effect, and initial evidence suggests that logistics operations will be maintained there at least for the short term. North Vietnamese logistics units have also continued to move food and supplies in areas just south of the DMZ during the past week, but it is too early to determine whether actual violations of the settlement agreement have occurred.